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How does an area’s natural resource endowment influence its economic development? 
Previous studies has generally confirmed that developing countries do suffer from resource 
curse as countries with abundant resource tend to have a slower economic growth rate 
compared with those without. There is, however, no consensus on what precisely the casual 
mechanism is. In this paper, I review efforts by both economists and political scientists, and 
then propose some hypotheses on how resource endowment would affect local governments’ 
financial behaviors according to relevant political theories. Given the fact that all governance 
behaviors and government functions should be supported by public finance, I argue that how 
to obtain fiscal revenue and allocate this limited amount among various categories of 
government function is of high importance to local governance performance. Shanxi works as 
an excellent case to test these hypotheses proposed as it provides detailed county-level coal 
sales. Basing on these data, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis on Shanxi’s county-level 
governments in 2007 to test how natural resource would influence local governments’ revenue 
and expenditure structure. The results show that, in the revenue aspect, local governments 
with abundant natural resource wealth tend to have a larger proportion of own fiscal revenue 
and informal revenue, because of political myopia and higher level of state autonomy. In 
terms of expenditure structure, they tend to have a lower proportion of social expenditure, 
including environmental protection expenditure and social security & medical expenditure, 
while a higher share of self-serving public administrative expenditure. Since government 
plays a key role in economic development today, it can be concluded that to shape 
government financial behaviors is one of the most important transmission channels through 
which natural resources affect local economic growth. Some brief suggestions are given in the 
end. 
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